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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
2a-3(j) and 78-2-2(4)(2001). 
Statement of Issue and Standard of Review 
The sole issue preserved below and presented on appeal is whether a Municipality 
has extraterritorial condemnation to acquire private property for the construction of 
a public street and related utilities and services associated therewith. Resolution of 
that issue involves interpretati< m < >f the I JT All CONSTITUTION, art XI, sec. 5(b) 
and (c). Constitutional interpretation is a question of law which this Court reviews 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion. (State v. 
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, No. 950059 (Utah 
May 9, 1/995); Financial Bancorp, Im • v Ping} i >e & Dahle. Im , 880 P 2d I I, 16 
(Utah App. 1994)) 
Constitutional Provisions, Rules, Statutes, Cases determinative of Appeal 
UTAH CONST, art XI, § § 5(b)(c) 
"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall 
include the following: 
i 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, 
construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease, public 
utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation, 
or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property 
necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions 
imposed by general law for the protection of other 
communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and 
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof. 
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate 
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire 
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement 
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in 
order to protect and preserve the improvement." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8. Streets, parks, airports, 
parking facilities, public grounds and pedestrian mails. 
They [municipalities] may lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve 
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, 
airports, parking lots or other facilities for the parking of 
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and 
may vacate the same or parts thereof, by ordinance." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1. Uses for which right may be 
exercised. 
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent 
domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public 
uses: 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of 
any county, city or incorporated town, or board 
of education; . . . pipes for conducting water 
for the use of the inhabitants of any county or 
city or incorporated town; . . . roads, streets 
and alleys; and all other public uses for the 
2 
benefit of any county, city or incorporated 
town, or the inhabitants thereof. 
* * * 
9) Sewerage of any city or town 
The following provisions from the "Transportation Corridor 
Preservation Act" UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-401 (2001) 
et. seq., 
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may: 
* * * 
(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights of 
less than fee simple, including easement and 
development rights, or the rights to limit 
development, including rights in alternative 
transportation corridors, and to make these 
acquisitions up to 20 years in advance of using 
those rights in actual transportation facility 
construction. (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-403 (l)(c) 
(2001))(Emphasis added) 
"(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection 
(1), counties and municipalities may: 
(a) limit development for transportation corridor 
preservation by land use regulation and by 
official maps; and 
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for 
approving limited development in transportation 
corridors until the time transportation facility 
construction begins."(Utah Code Ann. §72-5-
403 (2)(a)(c)(2001))(Emphasis added) 
3 
(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise 
of eminent domain or other police power, whereby 
government puts private property to public use or restrains 
use of private property for public purposes, and that requires 
compensation to be paid to private property owners. (Utah 
Code Ann. §72-5-401(5) (2001)) (Emphasis added) 
(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government 
authorities and recorded in county recording offices that: 
(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way, 
centerline alignments, and setbacks for 
highways and other transportation facilities; 
(b) provides a basis for restricting development 
in designated rights-of-way or between 
designated setbacks to allow the government 
authorities time to purchase or otherwise 
reserve the land; and 
(c) for counties and municipalities may be 
adopted as an element of the general plan, 
pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3, 
General Plan, or Title 10, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
General Plan." (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-
401(4)(a)(b)(c)(2001)) 
* * * 
"(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and recommend 
to the legislative body a proposed general plan for the area 
within the municipality. 
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of 
the municipality if, in the commission's judgment, they are 
related to the planning of the municipality's territory. 
(Utah Code Ann. §10-9-302(l)(a)(b)(2001))(Emphasis 
added) 
4 
Statement of the case 
This is an action in eminent domain wherein a City seeks to condemn 
property located in an island of "unincorporated" property within its municipal 
boundaries.1 The City has determined that it is reasonable and desirable to extend 
its existing public street by a connector road from University Ave eastward to 
Canyon Road, thereby providing a major additional traffic artery from the northeast 
quadrant of the City through the Defendants property (and others) and then 
connecting with 4800 North Street in Provo and onto Center Street in Orem and 
from there to the interstate freeway system. (R. 335) The District Court entered an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy and the landowners filed a Petition for Leave to 
File an Interlocutory Appeal to challenge that Order and that Petition was granted 
by this Court. The sole issue before the Court2 is whether a municipality has 
extraterritorial condemnation powers to acquire property for construction of a 
public street wherein water and sewer will be located. 
Summary of Arguments 
The City contends that the UTAH CONSTITUTION grants to it the right to 
condemn property "within or without its corporate limits" as required to provide 
1
 See Provo City Zoning Map, and illustrative maps showing the subject property, 
environs and proposed location of the public improvements attached as Addendum 
"A" 
2
 See Addendum "B" 
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"public services" and "public utilities" and that the proposed utilization of the 
property accomplishes that public purpose. The City maintains that statutory 
provisions implement the Constitutional grant of extraterritorial powers and that it 
has an express grant of such powers. The City contends, alternatively, that it 
has the power to condemn by "necessary implication" drawn from its expressed 
powers of eminent domain. 
Argument 
POINT I, 
A MUNICIPALITY HAS EXPRESS EXTRATERRITORIAL 
CONDEMNATION POWERS TO ACQUIRE RIGHTS OF WAY 
FOR A PUBLIC STREET 
A municipal corporation is a political subdivision of the sovereign State 
and is endowed by the State with powers to operate. 
"Municipalities shall be political subdivisions of the State of 
Utah, municipal corporations, and bodies politic with 
perpetual existence unless disincorporated according to law." 
(UTAH CODE ANN. §10-1-201 (2001)) 
As a political subdivision, its powers of eminent domain are dependent upon 
an express grant of that power from the sovereign. 
"That the powers of the city are strictly limited to those 
expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or 
incident to the powers expressly granted, and to those 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation, is settled law in this state." (American Fork City 
v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249, 250 (1930)) 
6 
As a general rule, use of condemnation powers by a governmental entity 
other than the sovereign itself is limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of that 
governmental entity. 
"As a general rule, the powers of a city are coextensive with 
its corporate limits." (Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 
286, 289 P. 132 (1930)). 
Therefore, if a municipality is to possess extraterritorial condemnation powers it 
must be by express grant from the legislature or arise by necessary implication 
ancillary to such an express grant: 
"Generally, a municipal corporation is confined to such area 
and is without power to acquire or hold real property beyond 
its territorial limits, unless the power to do so is expressly 
given by the legislature." (McQUILLIN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 2.24 p.2-162)(Emphasis added) 
* * * 
"A municipality may also be granted power to take for its 
own public uses land residing within the boundaries of 
another city or town. However, such power is dependent 
upon an express or implied grant of the power." (NICHOLS 
ON EMINENT DOMAIN, 3rd Ed. § 3.03[3][a] text and fa. 
31 .)(Emphasis added) 
* * * 
"The general rule is that the powers of a municipal 
corporation cease at its boundaries and such corporation 
cannot purchase or hold property beyond its territorial limits 
unless the power to do so has been expressly conferred upon 
7 
it by the Legislature." (Koerber v. City of New Orleans, 76 
So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1955))(Emphasis added) 
"It has been repeatedly stated by this court 'that a municipal 
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, 
and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, 
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the 
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the 
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable.' 1 
Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., p. 448, § 237; 
Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 
724; Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671; 
American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62 
P.2d 557; Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 
546, 58 P.2d 1; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 P.2d 161; Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 
234; City of Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River, etc., Co., 16 
Utah 440, 52 P. 697, 41 L.R.A. 305; 37 Am. Jur. 722."(Salt 
Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504; 124 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 
1942)) 
* * * 
"A municipality has only such powers as are expressly 
granted it by the legislature, such as may be necessarily 
implied and incident to those expressly granted, and those 
indispensable to the accomplishment of the declared objects 
and purposes of the municipality." (Parker v. Provo City 
Corp., 543 P.2d 769; (Utah 1975))(citing, Revene, supra.) 
From statehood, Utah municipalities were granted very broad extraterritorial 
condemnation powers in order to allow them to provide all "local public services 
and utilities" to their residents: 
8 
"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section 
shall include the following: 
# # * * 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to 
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and 
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent 
and use; to acquire by condemnation, or 
otherwise, within or without the corporate 
limits, property necessary for any such 
purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by 
general law for the protection of other 
communities3; . . . " (UTAH CONST, art. XI, 
§ 5(b))(Emphasis added)4 
That extraterritorial grant of eminent domain power to municipalities was insulated 
from legislative diminishment or infringement of any kind: 
"Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, 
and is hereby granted, the authority to exercise all powers 
relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within 
its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in 
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers 
in this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or 
3In the case sub judice the city is not seeking to acquire property within the 
boundaries of another municipality-a circumstance which would seemingly conflict 
with the retained right of each Municipality to "lay out and design" its own streets 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8 (2001). But even in those circumstances 
Courts have held that it is necessary to "balance" the public benefit between such 
conflicting statutes and has estopped one city from preventing an adjacent city from 
constructing a road within its boundaries by enacting conflicting zoning 
regulations.(City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 
P.2d 637 (1967)) 
The power of the city to regulate the peace and good order of its citizenry is not 
dependent only on statute. It is constitutional, being derived from Sec. 5., Art. 
Xl"(Allgood v.Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 532;(Utah 1976) (dissenting opinion). 
9 
restrict the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred;"(UTAH CONST, art. XI, § (5) (Emphasis added) 
And the Utah Legislature further guaranteed those rights in subsequent legislation: 
Nothing in this chapter [Eminent Domain] must be construed to 
abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of property 
in any city or town for street purposes." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-34-17 (2001)) 
* * * 
"The powers herein delegated [Municipal Code] to any municipality 
shall be liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the 
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to the 
intent of the law." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-1-103 (2001)) 
(Emphasis added) 
Therefore provisions of state law which on their face may appear to suggest 
otherwise are clearly subservient to the constitutionally guaranteed extraterritorial 
right of eminent domain reposing in municipalities.5 
5See e.g., 
"City streets - Class C roads - Construction and maintenance, (1) 
City streets comprise: 
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate 
limits of the municipalities that are not designated as 
class A state roads or as class B roads; ( UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 72-3-104 (2001)) 
County roads - Class B roads - Construction and maintenance by counties, 
(1) County roads comprise all public highways, roads, 
and streets within the state that: 
10 
Accordingly, pivotal to resolution of this appeal is the determination of 
whether a proposed public street, not located entirely within6 the extant boundaries 
of a municipality and in which water and sewer lines will also be placed is either a 
"local public service[s]" and/or one of the "public utilities local in extent and use" 
permitting extraterritorial condemnation by a municipality. 
Appellants assert that a public street is not a "public service or utility" but, 
rather is "a public improvement" and is governed by art. XI, Sec 5(c) limiting 
eminent domain to property "within" the municipalities corporate limits. 
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate 
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire 
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement 
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in 
order to protect and preserve the improvement." (UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, art. XI, § 5(c)) 
The City asserts that a public street in which water and sewer lines will also be 
located are admittedly clearly "improvements" just as any and all constructed 
facilities are "improvements," but a transportation improvement is also a "public 
(a) are situated outside of incorporated municipalities 
and not designated as state highways.(UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 72-3-103(2001)). 
^Technically the Appellants property is "within the corporate limits" of Provo City 
as the exterior boundaries of the City completely surround their property. But it is 
assumed that the issue for interpretation means "within" the jurisdictional 
boundaries as opposed to pure geographic exterior boundaries. 
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services" or "public utilities" which can be located on easements obtained through 
extraterritorial condemnation under art. XI, sec 5(b). 
In construing and applying Sections 5(b) and (c)7 the Court is required to 
make an initial determination as to exigencies sought to be addressed or remedied 
by adoption of the specific constitutional provisions: 
"In interpreting these words and ascertaining their meaning as 
used, it becomes important to consider, in the light of the 
conditions and growing necessities of the municipalities, the 
scope and purpose of the entire provision. "Constitutions are 
not to be interpreted alone by their words abstractly 
considered, but by their words read in the light of the 
conditions and necessities in which the provisions originated, 
and in view of the purposes sought to be attained and 
secured." Dillon Mun. Corp., sec. 3a." (State v. O'Meara, 
23 Utah 13, 64 P. 460, 462(1900))(Emphasis added) 
* * * 
"A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical 
principles, but liberally, and on broad, general lines, in order 
that it may accomplish the object of its establishment, and 
carry out the great principles of the government. The words 
are not to be stretched beyond their fair sense, but within that 
7It should be noted that art. XI, § 5(b)(c) is the paramount source of a municipalities 
eminent domain powers with only a few specific additional bequests made in 
subsequent legislation-/. £., the right to condemn for pedestrian malls under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-15-5 (2001); the right to condemn water and water systems 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-4 (2001); outdoor advertising billboards under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-409 (2001); and air rights, navigation easements and 
non-conforming structures near airports under UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-10-413 
(2001).All other takings for public uses and purposes must be premised on the 
Constitutional endowment of art. XI, § 5 or UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-
1(3)(2001). 
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range the rule of interpretation must be taken which best 
follows out the apparent intention of its framers." Black, 
Interp. Laws, p. 13." {North Point Consol. Irr. Co., v. Utah 
& S.L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824, 825-26 (1896)) 
* * * 
"Statutes which delegate the State's sovereign power of 
eminent domain to its political subdivisions are to be strictly 
construed. Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 29 130,437 
P.2d 171 (1968); State ex. rel. Devonshire v. Superior Court, 
70 Wash. 630, 424 P. 2d 913 (1967). However, as we said 
in Devonshire, a statutory grant of such power is not to be so 
strictly construed as to thwart or defeat apparent legislative 
intent or objective." (In re Petition of City of Seattle, 638 
P.2d 549, 557 (Wash. 1981)" 
The Courts task in construing legislation involving eminent domain is well 
defined: 
"The question therefore is, 'Is the right sought to be 
exercised by appellant granted in any one or more of the 
foregoing provisions? 
If the right is granted, the court has but one duty to perform, 
and that is to enforce it and make it effective. Upon the other 
hand, if the right is not granted, either in terms or by 
necessary implication, then the courts are powerless to grant 
the relief appellant seeks." (Monetaire Mining Co. v. 
Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 421, 
174 P. 172, 175 (1918)). 
Applying these interpretative guidelines it is respectfully submitted that 
"improvements" must logically refer to the common and customary usage of said 
words pertaining to permanent buildings traditionally located conveniently "within " 
the central portion of a city and constructed to conduct municipal activities therein, 
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e.g., its executive, administration and judicial buildings, schools, libraries, 
hospitals, public security and maintenance buildings. Whereas "services" and 
"utilities" are less audacious and more fluid undertakings, often somewhat 
consumptive in nature and thus being routinely enlarged, relocated, redesigned or 
even vacated as changing conditions dictate. Being more aqueous in nature they 
were not confined to the municipal boundaries but could be "within or without" the 
city limits. Clearly water and its impoundment and distribution systems, sewer 
collection and its treatment facilities, electrical generation sites and its distribution 
facilities -traditional "utilities" were foreseen to often exist naturally, or by 
preference and design, outside the city limits. And more modern "utilities" and 
"services" (such as transportation facilities and systems, airports, trams, subways, 
high speed commuter trains, ferries) have subsequently arisen and must fall 
somewhere within these two original Constitutional provisions. 
"Utilities" are defined by Webster to include: 
"1 : fitness for some purpose or worth to some end 
2 : something useful or designed for use 
3 a :
 PUBLIC UTILITY b (1) : a service (as light, power, 
or water) provided by a public utility (2) : equipment or a 
piece of equipment to provide such service or a comparable 
service 
4 : a program or routine designed to perform or facilitate 
especially routine operations (as copying files or editing text) 
on a con uter" (emphasis added) 
Services" are defined by Webster to include: 
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"1 a : the occupation or function of serving <in active 
service > b : employment as a servant < entered his 
service > 
2 a : the work performed by one that serves <good 
service> b : HELP, USE, BENEFIT <glad to be of 
service > c : contribution to the welfare of others d : disposal 
for use <Fm entirely at your service > 
3 a : a form followed in worship or in a religious ceremony 
<the burial service > b : a meeting for worship ~ often used 
in plural <held evening services > 
4 : the act of serving : as a : a helpful act <did him a 
service > b : useful labor that does not produce a tangible 
commodity - usually used in plural < charge for professional 
services > c : SERVE 
5 : a set of articles for a particular use <a silver tea 
service > 
6 a : an administrative division (as of a government or 
business) <the consular service > b : one of a nation1 s 
military forces (as the army or navy) 
7 a : a facility supplying some public demand < telephone 
service > <bus service > b : a facility providing 
maintenance and repair" (emphasis added) 
Since it is uncontested herein that one usage of the easement sought herein is 
indisputably for the placement of traditional "public utilities local in use" (water 
and sewer) it is perhaps unnecessary for this Court to determine if a public street, 
alone, is a "public service" or "public utility" under subsection 5(b) or is a "public 
improvement" under 5(c). But it is respectfully submitted that a public street is by 
itself also a "public service" and/or a "public utility." 
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An airport, comprised of miles of asphalt upon which motorized vehicles 
transport persons in and out of cities has been held to be " . . . a well-nigh 
indispensable public utility:" 
"Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that airplanes have 
been used for many years in the transportation of mail and 
passengers, that large sums of money has been devoted to the 
development of aircraft as a commercial industry, and that it 
has become 'an important, if not, indeed, a well-nigh 
indispensable public utility." (NICHOLS, "LAW OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN" 2nd Ed. § 7.35(1) p. 7-203; quoting 
Thrasher v. Atlanta, 173 S. E. 817, 819 (1958)) 
While several definitions within the Utah Code classify "utilities" in the 
traditional sense: 
(b) "Utility" includes telecommunication, gas, electricity, 
cable television, water, sewer, data, and video transmission 
lines, drainage and irrigation systems, and other similar 
utilities located in, on, along, across, over, through, or under 
any state highway. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-6-116 (l)(b) 
(2001)) 
the legislature has included within the definition of "public utility" transportation 
facilities for purposes of regulation by a special commission: 
"(15) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, 
gas corporation, electrical corporation, distribution electrical 
cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone 
corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, 
sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent 
energy producer . . ."(UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1 (15(a) 
(2001))(Emphasis added) 
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And this Court has noted that providing transportation facilities is the 
providing of "public services:" 
"The appellant also claims that the case of Dooly Block v. 
Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company is authority for its claim to 
relief. There Salt Lake City had granted an easement to the 
defendant to construct a railway in the street in front of the 
plaintiffs business property. The use was for a private 
corporation engaged in public services but for financial 
gain."(Anderson Inv. Corp., v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 
P.2d 144, 147 (1972) (emphasis added) 
Moreover "local streets and roads" are "municipal services" for which 
budgeting and reporting requirements are imposed by law: 
(21) "Municipal capital project" means the acquisition, 
construction, or improvement of capital assets that facilitate 
providing municipal service. 
(22) "Municipal service" means a service not provided on a 
county wide basis and not accounted for in an enterprise fund, 
and includes police patrol, fire protection, culinary or 
irrigation water retail service, water conservation, local 
parks, sewers, sewage treatment and disposal, cemeteries, 
garbage and refuse collection, street lighting, airports, 
planning and zoning, local streets and roads, curb, gutter, 
and sidewalk maintenance, and ambulance service." 
("Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Counties' UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 17-36-3 (21)(22)(2001))(Emphasis added)) 
The District Judge below astutely pronounced in his ruling on the Motion 
being reviewed: "The Court determines that providing adequate and reasonable 
transportation facilities to, from and within its boundaries is one of the most basic 
'public services' or 'public utilities' which municipalities generally provide, and 
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therefore Provo City is permitted to utilize its constitutionally endowed power of 
eminent domain to acquire the property necessary to construct its proposed public 
street." (R.335)—and while no deference need be given to such conclusion, said 
conclusion is difficult to rebut. 
Recent legislation clearly shows the legislative acknowledgment of the 
constitutional right and the intent to allow municipalities to acquire, by eminent 
domain, requisite easements for public streets outside of their corporate limits. 
The "Transportation Corridor Preservation Act" UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-401 
(2001) et. seq., enacted in 2000 clearly envisions the possible "taking" of property 
for streets by municipalities both "within and without" their corporate limits. 
Under that Act "the department [UDOT], counties, and municipalities" may 
"acquire" easements or fee interests in land which those entities determine are 
necessary for future transportation facility needs: 
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may: 
* * * 
(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights 
of less than fee simple, including easement and 
development rights, or the rights to limit 
development, including rights in alternative 
transportation corridors, and to make these 
acquisitions up to 20 years in advance of using 
those rights in actual transportation facility 
construction. (UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-403 
(l)(c)(2001))(Emphasis added) 
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This "acquisition" may be accomplished "directly or indirectly." It is 
accomplished "indirectly" by enactment of restrictions upon the future use and 
development of property proposed for future transportation needs or by direct 
acquisition (eminent domain or purchase): 
"(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection 
(1), counties and municipalities may: 
(a) limit development for transportation 
corridor preservation by land use regulation 
and by official maps; and 
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for 
approving limited development in 
transportation corridors until the time 
transportation facility construction 
begins. "(UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-403 
(2)(a), (c)(2001)) 
The Act acknowledging that such activity may well rise to a quantum of 
interference with private property rights so as to constitute a " regulatory taking" 
under other recently enacted legislation: 
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities shall 
observe all protections conferred on private property rights, 
including Title 63, Chapter 90, Private Property Protection 
Act, Title 63, Chapter 90a, Constitutional Taking Issues, 
and compensation for takings. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-
5-405 (1)(2001))8 
8
 "Regulatory takings" require condemnation and payment of just compensation: 
"As used in this chapter: 
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This concept of "regulatory takings" is perpetuated in the Transportation Corridor 
Preservation Act as well: 
(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise 
of eminent domain or other police power, whereby 
government puts private property to public use or restrains 
use of private property for public purposes, and that 
requires compensation to be paid to private property owners. 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-40 l(5)(2001))(Emphasis 
added) 
Or, as noted above, the action may be "direcdy" " . . . by exercise of eminent 
domain." In summary, a municipality is permitted to "take" either by act or 
regulation, or by the exercise of eminent domain, requisite easements or fee 
interest in property for future transportation facilities. And how is this acquisition 
to be accomplished? By including said designated "corridors" within their 
adopted and recorded general land use plans: 
"(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government 
authorities and recorded in county recording offices that: 
(1) "Constitutional taking issues" means actions involving the physical taking or 
exaction of private real property by a political subdivision that might require 
compensation to a private real property owner because of: 
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; 
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution; or 
(2) "Political subdivision" means a county, municipality, special district, school 
district, or other local government entity. ( UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-90a-l 
(2001)) 
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(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way, 
centerline alignments, and setbacks for 
highways and other transportation facilities; 
(b) provides a basis for restricting development 
in designated rights-of-way or between 
designated setbacks to allow the government 
authorities time to purchase or otherwise 
reserve the land; and 
(c) for counties and municipalities may be 
adopted as an element of the general plan, 
pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3, 
General Plan, or Title 10, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
General Plan." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-
401(4)(a)(b)(c)(2001)) 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-302 (2001) referred to above a municipality is 
specifically permitted to include for future development and use areas "outside the 
boundaries of the municipality:" 
"(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and 
recommend to the legislative body a proposed general plan 
for the area within the municipality. 
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of 
the municipality if, in the commission's judgment, they 
are related to the planning of the municipality's territory. 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-302(l)(a)(b)(2001)) 
Therefore, it is futile to argue that a municipality cannot directly act under art. XI, 
sec 5(b) and acquire by extraterritorial condemnation property needed for a public 
transportation facility when it could indirectly acquire those same easements, 
extraterritorially, by the enactment of restrictions on the development of such 
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proposed future street sites with such prohibitory regulation on use of the land for 
any contrary purpose so that the enactment itself constitutes a " regulatory taking" 
and requires condemnation and payment of just compensation under the 
"Transportation Corridor Preservation Act" and " Private Property Protection 
Act." A city cannot be compelled to take such an indirect and circuitous route to 
acquire this land when the Constitution prohibits restrictive legislation on a 
municipality's rights to directly acquire property by extraterritorial condemnation. 
POINT II 
A MUNICIPALITY HAS IMPLIED EXTRATERRITORIAL 
CONDEMNATION POWERS TO ACQUIRE RIGHTS OF 
WAY FOR A PUBLIC STREET. 
In addition to extraterritorial condemnation powers expressly granted, cities 
must have such powers to extend and connect their public streets, water and sewer 
facilities from one portion of their boundaries to another through temporary 
unincorporated areas under the " reasonably necessarily implied" doctrine. 
"The powers of a city are strictly limited to those expressly 
granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident 
to the powers expressly granted, and to those essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the corporation."( 
American Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 
(1930); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 28, 
317 P.2d 597 (1957); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 
504, 124 P.2d 537, modified on other grounds, 101 Utah 
512, 127 P.2d 254 (1942); (Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 
533; 216 P. 234; 235 (1923)(Emphasis added) 
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* * * 
"Accordingly, while there is no settled rule in respect to this 
question, if the power exists to construct public works or 
improve property outside the municipal limits, and the 
statute or charter expressly or by necessary implication 
authorizes the condemnation of property within the 
corporate limits for such purposes, then the municipality is 
impliedly authorized to condemn outside the limits for such 
purposes." (McQUILLIN, "MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS" § 32.66 P. 524. citing North 
Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co. of Calif., 192 Cal App 2d 
482, 13 Cal Rptr 538; Carlsbad v. Wight, 221 Cal App 2d 
911, 34 Cal Rptr 820; Village ofDeerfield v. Rapka, 54 111 
2d 217, 296 NE2d 336; Helm v. Grayville, 224 111 274, 79 
NE 689; City of Gulfport v. Orange Grove Utilities, 735 So 
2d 1041 (Miss 1999); City of Springfield v. Brechbuhler, 
895 SW2d 583 (Mo. 1995); Central Power Co. v. Nebraska 
City, 112 F2d 471; Charlotte v. Heath, 226 NC 750, 40 
SE2d 600; Payallup v. Lacey, 43 Wash 110, 86 P. 215)) 
This Court has applied the "necessarily implied" doctrine of Sutter to find 
jurisdiction to condemn where, as in the case sub judice, multiple "public 
services" are involved. In Utah DOT v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979) this 
Court held that UDOT could condemn property for a "sewage treatment 
lagoon" impliedly from its grant of power to condemn for a "rest stop" where 
drinking water and toilet facilities were to be constructed. 
"Plaintiffs authority to acquire real property for highway 
purposes generally and roadside rest areas specifically is set 
out in § 27-12-96 and subsection (11), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. That statute states that the term 
'highway purposes' is not limited exclusively to those 
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enumerated. It is obvious that rest areas offering drinking 
water and toilet facilities require waste disposal provisions. 
The record in this case supports the sewage lagoon as the 
disposal method of choice. Since the statutory language 
authorizes 'the construction and maintenance of roadside rest 
areas,' and the term 'maintenance' would logically include 
waste disposal necessitated by services offered at the rest 
area, the power to construct and maintain a sewage lagoon 
may be implied in the statutory grant of power relied upon 
by plaintiff. See Illinois State Toll Highway Commission v. 
Eden Cemetery Association, 16 I11.2d 539, 158 N.E.2d 766, 
769-770 (1959), where the court said in connection with 
condemnation for service facilities on toll highways, 'We 
think . . . . that since access to sewer and water facilities is 
essential to the operation of service stations and restaurants, 
the reasoning which sustains the propriety of arrangements 
for the latter must uphold as well a reasonable exercise of 
condemnation powers in obtaining the former.' See also 
Tormaschy v. Hjelle, N.D., 210 N.W.2d 100 (1973). 
Although defendants cite Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island 
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), for 
the contention that the power to condemn cannot be obtained 
by implication, their reliance is misplaced. In that case the 
authority was created by statute to preserve and develop the 
Great Salt Lake, but its statutory powers with reference to 
the acquisition of property on Antelope Island did not 
include the right to take by eminent domain. Plaintiff in the 
present case clearly has express statutory condemnation 
powers for highway purposes." {Utah DOT v. Fuller, 603 
P.2d 814,816 (Utah 1979)) 
In the case sub judice, the reverse exists. The city has indisputable power 
to condemn extraterritorially for public utilities (water and sewer lines), and 
therefore it must, under the rationale of Fuller by that same "necessary 
implication" possess the power to condemn for the road in which to locate, access 
and maintain those public utilities. 
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"We think it is generally agreed that where the right of 
eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the 
statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of 
such purposes." (Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 422, 174 P. 172, 175 
(1918)) 
* * * 
"The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be 
liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the 
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to 
the intent of the law." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-1-103 
(2001)) 
The constitutional grant to Utah municipalities is so concise and 
unequivocal that there are no recorded cases of any successful challenge to a 
municipalities' exercise of those powers since statehood. The only reported 
appellate decision in Utah wherein extraterritorial condemnation was challenged 
arose in Bertagnoli v. Baker, 111 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950) heavily 
relied upon herein and below by Appellants. In that case the Salt Lake City 
School Board, (not the City itself, but a separate legislatively created entity9) 
9
"In previous decisions of this court we have recognized that boards of education 
are public municipal corporations; that their powers are purely statutory; and that 
the legislature may authorize the governing authorities of school districts to do 
anything not prohibited by the Constitution. Also, that the boards of education 
have only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them and such implied 
powers as are necessary to execute and carry into effect their express powers. 
Chamberlain v. Watters, 10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566; Beard v. Board of Education, 
81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900. Thus we must examine the statutes of this state to 
determine the extent of the authority given to boards of education to condemn land 
for proper purposes." (Bertagnoli, p. 628) 
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attempted to condemn property outside its jurisdictional boundaries. This Court 
recognized the general principles above set forth, citing both NICHOLS and 
McQUILLIN allowing municipal extraterritorial condemnation where expressly 
granted or necessarily implied, but refused to extend that extraterritorial 
condemnation powers to a School Board: 
"In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Second Ed., Revised, 
Sec. 1619, pg. 546, it is stated that fa municipal corporation cannot 
condemn land within the state but outside its corporate limits unless 
the power has been delegated by the legislature.' See Lewis, 
Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 371, for a similar statement. When 
the power of eminent domain is given by statute, it is a well settled 
principle of law amply supported by cases from many jurisdictions in 
this country, that the extent to which the power may be exercised is 
limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute. City 
of Birmingham v. Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 So.2d 305; Maine-New 
Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority v. Ham, 91 N.H. 179, 16 
A.2d 362; Detroit G. H. and M. Railway Company v. Weber, 24, 
Mich. 28, 226 N.W. 663; U. S. v. Threlkeld, 10 Cir., 72 F.2d 464, 
certiorari denied 293 U. S. 620, 55 S.Ct. 215, 79 L. Ed. 708; State 
ex rel. King County v. Superior Court for King County, Wash., 204 
P.2d 514; Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 371." (emphasis 
added) 
The Court denied the School Board extraterritorial condemnation power in the 
absence of either an express statutory grant or a more logically implied grant of 
such power other than the argued silence of the Legislature and/or the absence of 
a specific prohibition denying Boards that power: 
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"Thus it follows that the authority contended for by the 
School Board not having been expressly given and not 
being clearly inferable from our statutes, must be denied it. 
Under the authorities on this subject, power cannot be 
derived from the doubtful inferences which support the 
School Board's claim of authority." (Zrf.)(emphasis added) 
While Bertagnoli is Appellants chief case, it is simply not helpful precedent. 
Without such broad extraterritorial powers municipalities would often be 
precluded from providing even the most basic public utilities and services such as 
water, electricity, sewer, solid waste disposal, and airports because those 
amenities are often located in remote areas beyond city boundaries, the more 
obnoxious of those facilities being deliberately planned and constructed some 
distance outside city boundaries so as to avoid creating public nuisances in 
residential and commercial areas. Those facilities require access roads and streets 
and it is absurd to suggest that municipalities can create or develop such facilities 
but cannot create extraterritorially the necessary public streets to access and 
maintain them. Accordingly Utah, like most states in the Union, expressly 
provided for extraterritorial condemnation powers in cities to allow them to 
provide basic services and utilities. 
Cities must be able to plan for the orderly flow of traffic in, out and 
through their jurisdictions and allow for future connections and alignments with 
existing streets in other jurisdictions and with interstate facilities. Cities often 
have temporary pockets of unincorporated land within or adjacent their 
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boundaries awaiting petitions for annexation and it is absurd to suggest that all 
city streets and service facilities have to terminate at the boundaries of said 
unincorporated property or take a circuitous temporary alignment. Such a 
truncated planning system would lead to absurd temporary street configurations 
and traffic congestion, the avoidance of which can only be resolved by permitted 
annexation with windfall concessions to landowners who could prevent the 
acquisition of rights of way for needed public utilities and services through their 
property if eminent domain was unavailable. Those concessions often result in an 
exorbitant extracted purchase price or outlandish development concessions 
(development fee waivers, increased permitted density development, zoning 
concessions, etc.,)- and it is precisely for that reason that the Legislature 
protected, by Constitutional guarantee not capable of abridgment by subsequent 
legislation, municipalities extraterritorial eminent domain powers to provide all of 
their basic public services and utilities, not the least of which are the public streets 
allowing orderly flow of traffic in, out, and through a city and the placement 
therein the ancillary additional public utilities commonly located therein. 
Summary 
A city is a living and vibrant creation. It must, like the human body, have the 
necessary circulatory vessels to transport in, out and through its being its life 
supporting commodities- water, sewer, electricity, gas, communication facilities 
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and, most importantly, the people who comprise the city and produce and 
consume those commodities. It cannot be strangled by imposing restrictions on its 
ability to procure the necessary rights to maintain its life sustaining systems. For 
this reason the Constitution granted extremely broad extraterritorial condemnation 
powers to municipalities to insure their growth, vitality and survival-imposing 
strong prohibition on any attempted constriction of those powers. Public streets 
are the aorta in this system. Within their margins are customarily located all of 
the smaller vessels carrying ancillary services and utilities— water, sewer, gas, and 
along its boundaries electric power and communication facilities. It makes no 
sense to suggest that a city has the ability to transport all those commodities in and 
out of its borders through extraterritorial condemnation of the requisite easements, 
but the inability to also construct on said easements a street to access and maintain 
those facilities and to transport the people who produce and consume those items. 
Clearly no more basic "service" is provided by a city that the construction and 
maintenance of transportation facilities-whether they be generally classified as 
"services" of "utilities." Without the power to circulate its residents in and out of 
its corporate limits with streets that sometimes have to traverse temporarily 
unincorporated areas to reach county or state roads a city would suffocate in its 
own congestion. While the power of eminent domain, being in derogation of 
private property rights, is to be strictly construed and applied, the allowance of 
easements which encumber the surface use rights of property obtained to provide 
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circulation of human necessities (water, gas, sewer, electricity) to be additionally 
used for the circulation of those who consume or produce those necessities seems 
both logical and non-prejudicial to those already encumbered property rights. But 
the City is not to prevail herein because of "reasoned and logical necessity"-it is 
to prevail because it has the Constitutional right to condemn extraterritorially—a 
right that cannot be abridged. 
Relief Sought 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy entered below finding that the City has 
the "right to take" the subject easements for construction and maintenance of a 
public street, water and sewer facilities should be affirmed. 
DATED this J7t: of Apra, 2003. % ^ ^ Q ^ L l ^ 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
Attorney for Respondent/Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the' V day of April, 2003, I mailed, postage 
prepaid two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
to the following: 
30 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 East 100 North 
Provo, UT 84606 y~^ 
rarold A. Hintze 


















































By open Court stipulation of Counsel at the hearing on the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, the sole issue reserved for appeal was the issue of 
extraterritorial condemnation. The landowners offered not a scintilla of evidence 
or argument as to any other issue. The RULING ON MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY included the following finding: 
"9. The Defendants have not required Plaintiff to produce any 
additional testimony or evidence regarding the necessity for the 
"taking," the reasons for a speedy and immediate occupancy of the 
premises, the relative equities of granting or denying occupancy 
pendente lite, or any and all other factors required and prescribed 
by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (2001), said Defendants 
acknowledging that all such factors exist justifying entry of an 
order of immediate occupancy other than their claim that the 
Plaintiff lacks extraterritorial condemnation powers to condemn 
their property for purposes of a public street. Defendants deny that 
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this action because the 
subject property is unincorporated and not within the boundaries of 
Provo City." (R. 333) 
Therefore the following "facts" or "findings" in Appellants' Brief, undesignated 
by citation to the Record below, are irrelevant and immaterial to the singular 
issue reserved by stipulation of Counsel to be presented on appeal: 
l. "Spring Canyon's property is located on the benchland approximately 100 
feet above the road to which Provo City intends to connect the proposed 
road." (Appellants Brief, p. 3) (Unsupported by the record and irrelevant 
and immaterial) 
i 
2. "This problem [an island within the City] was created by the city's own 
annexation actions." (Appellants Brief, p. 3)(Argument not applicable to any 
issue herein) 
3. "The Provo Municipal Council purportedly passed a resolution (2000-116) 
providing for the condemnation of the Spring Canyon's property on 
December 19, 2000 (Rec, Pg. 2) Roughly eighteen months passed before 
Provo City took official action pursuant to this resolution. (Rec. Pg. 35). . . 
In its resolution, the Provo Municipal Council stated that the purpose of the 
connector road was to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods 
shopping center and other businesses located on the west side of University 
Avenue. (Rec. Pg. 112 & 2.) (Appellants Brief, p. 4) [ And the balance of 
the factual recitation implying that the Resolutions and Complaint are 
disparate or defective is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue reserved] 
4. "Although it will only create two lanes for automobile traffic, the proposed 
road design constitutes 83 (eighty-three) feet of right of way, to flare to 93 
(ninety-three) feet as it approaches the Canyon Road from the west. (Rec. Pg. 
102-103). It will require raising the level of the land sought to be 
condemned by 6' as it approaches the brow of the benchland." (Appellants 
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Brief, p. 5) (Again, no issue was raised or preserved concerning the 
"excessiveness" of the take, nor the public need or public use.) 
5. "Spring Canyons presently use the land for agricultural purposes and in the 
operation of a livestock business. (Rec. Pg. 334 & 322-304). The proposed 
road will sever Spring Canyon's property, leaving a parcel located in the 
northeast section of their existing property. (See Map of Spring Canyon's 
Land, attached hereto as Exhibit "F", Rec. Pg. 118; see also Highlighted 
Map attached as Exhibit "G"). This action will essentially destroy Spring 
Canyon's use of the land. The construction of the road will not allow Spring 
Canyon to use the remaining land in its livestock operation because the 
lambing operations would be disturbed by the proximity of a major road." 
(Appellants Brief, p. 6) (Appellant omits to inform the Court that the City 
originally included the severed piece as an "uneconomic remnant" and 
planned on including it in the take—but it was "excluded" from the "taking" 
by stipulation of the parties after the Appellants requested the same—again, 
inflammatory argument, but not in the least relevant to the sole issue reserved 
for appeal.) 
"6. The proposed construction of the connector street would sever 
the Defendants property leaving a parcel located in the northeast 
section of their existing property. Plaintiff included within its 
Amended Complaint a request to condemn that parcel on the theory 
that it was an "uneconomic remnant" and the conduct of the City 
effectively, if not literally, constituted such an interference with the 
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use and utility of said severed parcel as to constitute a de facto 
"taking" thereof. Plaintiff has acknowledged that the "taking" of 
said severed parcel is not necessary to the accomplishment of the 
public purpose for which the other perpetual easements are sought 
(i.e., the 4800 North connection) and has offered to delete said 
severed parcel from the Amended Complaint should the Defendants 
desire. The Defendants have indicated their desire that said parcel 
not be included within the "take" and, accordingly, by mutual 
stipulation of the parties, said parcel is to be stricken from the 
description of the property interests to be acquired herein by 
eminent domain." (R. 334) 
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Addendum C Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, art XI, sec. 5 
Sec. 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special laws - Legislature to 
provide for the incorporation, organization, dissolution, and classification of 
cities and towns - Charter cities.] 
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by special laws. 
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the incorporation, organization and 
dissolution of cities and towns and for their classification in proportion to 
population. Any incorporated city or town may frame and adopt a charter for its 
own government in the following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, and 
upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes 
cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith 
provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a 
commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall require that the 
question be submitted to the electors at the next regular municipal election. The 
ballot containing such question shall also contain the names of candidates for 
members of the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such 
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required by law for 
nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of 
choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates 
receiving a majority of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute the charter 
commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city at 
an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, 
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and 
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date. 
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately. The 
commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the proposed 
charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not 
less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed 
charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such city at such time as 
may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing charter and all laws 
affecting the organization and government of such city which are now in conflict 
therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter as 
adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by the seal of 
such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the 
i 
secretary of State and the other in the office of the city recorder, and thereafter 
all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter 
commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be 
proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof, 
or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per cent of the 
total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any such 
amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having 
been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part 
of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed 
as provided in case of charters. 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby granted, 
the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt 
and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in 
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in this constitution 
or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority 
hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the power to 
regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public 
utilities is provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the 
power of the legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws 
applicable alike to all cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the 
following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the 
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special 
assessments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, 
construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local 
in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within 
or without the corporate limits, property necessary for any such 
purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law for the 
protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility 
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits 
necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire an excess 
over than [that] needed for any such improvement and to sell or 
lease such excess property with restrictions, in order to protect and 
preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess 
prog«j|y, or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the 
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revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case of public utility, a 
franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the 
purchaser may operate such utility. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1999, S.J.R. 5, § 8. 
Provisions from the UTAH CODE ANN. 
10-1-103. Construction. 
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be liberally construed to 
permit the municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in cases 
clearly contrary to the intent of the law. 
History: C. 1953, 10-1-103, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 1. 
10-1-201. Municipalities as political subdivisions of the state. 
Municipalities shall be political subdivisions of the State of Utah, municipal 
corporations, and bodies politic with perpetual existence unless disincorporated 
according to law. 
History: C. 1953, 10-1-201, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 1. 
10-7-4. Water supply - Acquisition - Condemnation - Protest - Special 
election. 
The board of commissioners, city council or board of trustees of any city or 
town may acquire, purchase or lease all or any part of any water, waterworks 
system, water supply or property connected therewith, and whenever the 
governing body of a city or town shall deem it necessary for the public good 
such city or town may bring condemnation proceedings to acquire the same; 
provided, that if within thirty days after the passage and publication of a 
resolution or ordinance for the purchase or lease or condemnation herein 
provided for one-third of the resident taxpayers of the city or town, as shown by 
the assessment roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease or condemnation 
proceedings contemplated, such proposed purchase, lease or condemnation shall 
be referred to a special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote thereat, 
shall take effect; otherwise it shall be void. In all condemnation proceedings the 
value of land affected by the taking must be considered in connection with the 
water or water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the city or town or the 
inhabitants thereof with water. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 103, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 206x2; C.L. 1917, § 575; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-4. 
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10-8-8. Streets, parks, airports, parking facilities, public grounds and 
pedestrian malls. 
They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or 
otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, 
airports, parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets, 
public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts thereof, 
by ordinance. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206, subd. 8; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915, 
ch. 100, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x8; L. 1919, ch. 11, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
15-8-8; L. 1965, ch. 18, § [1]; 1966 (2nd S.S.), ch. 1, § 1. 
10-9-302. Plan preparation. 
(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and recommend to the legislative 
body a proposed general plan for the area within the municipality. 
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of the municipality if, in 
the commission's judgment, they are related to the planning of the municipality's 
territory. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, when the plan of a municipality 
involves territory outside the boundaries of the municipality, the municipality 
may not take action affecting that territory without the concurrence of the county 
or other municipalities affected. 
(2) The general plan, with the accompanying maps, plats, charts and descriptive 
and explanatory matter, shall show the planning commission's recommendations 
for the development of the territory covered by the plan, and may include, 
among other things: 
(a) a land use element that: 
(i) designates the proposed general distribution and location and extent of uses of 
land for housing, business, industry, agriculture, recreation, education, public 
buildings and grounds, open space, and other categories of public and private 
uses of land as appropriate; and 
(ii) may include a statement of the standards of population density and building 
intensity recommended for the various land use categories covered by the plan; 
(b) a transportation and circulation element consisting of the general location and 
extent of existing and proposed freeways, arterial and collector streets, mass 
transit, and any other modes of transportation that are appropriate, all correlated 
with the land use element of the plan; 
(c) an environmental element that addresses: 
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(i) the protection, conservation, development, and use of natural resources, 
including the quality of air, forests, soils, rivers and other waters, harbors, 
fisheries, wildlife, minerals, and other natural resources; and 
(ii) the reclamation of land, flood control, prevention and control of the pollution 
of streams and other waters, regulation of the use of land on hillsides, stream 
channels and other environmentally sensitive areas, the prevention, control, and 
correction of the erosion of soils, protection of watersheds and wetlands, and the 
mapping of known geologic hazards; 
(d) a public services and facilities element showing general plans for sewage, 
waste disposal, drainage, local utilities, rights-of-way, easements, and facilities 
for them, police and fire protection, and other public services; 
(e) a rehabilitation, redevelopment, and conservation element consisting of plans 
and programs for: 
(i) historic preservation; and 
(ii) the elimination of blight and for redevelopment, including housing sites, 
business and industrial sites, and public building sites; 
(f) an economic element composed of appropriate studies and an economic 
development plan that may include review of municipal revenue and 
expenditures, revenue sources, identification of base and residentiary industry, 
primary and secondary market areas, employment, and retail sales activity; 
(g) recommendations for implementing the plan, including the use of zoning 
ordinances, subdivision ordinances, capital improvement plans, and other 
appropriate actions; and 
(h) any other elements the municipality considers appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-302, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 13; 1992, ch. 23, 
§ 7; 1992, ch. 93, § 3. 
10-9-409. Existing outdoor advertising uses. 
(1) A municipality may only require termination of a billboard and associated 




(d) exchange; or 
(e) eminent domain. 
(2) A termination under Subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), or (d) requires the voluntary 
consent of the billboard owner. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-409, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 263, § 1. 
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10-15-5. Powers of acquisition and improvement. 
The legislative body of the municipalities shall also have the power to acquire by 
gift, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise, land, real property or rights of 
way which shall become part of the municipal street established as a pedestrian 
mall, or which shall otherwise be used by the municipality as a part of, or for 
purposes connected with, a pedestrian mall, and such lands, real property or 
rights of way may be improved in the same manner as municipal streets may be 
improved. The legislative body shall also have the power to make such 
improvements on mall intersections and intersecting streets or upon facilities 
acquired for parking and other related purposes where such improvements are 
necessary or convenient to the operation of the mall. The acquisitions and 
improvements authorized by this section shall be deemed "improvements." 
History: L. 1966 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 5. 
17-36-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Accrual basis of accounting" means a method where revenues are recorded 
when earned and expenditures recorded when they become liabilities 
notwithstanding that the receipt of the revenue or payment of the expenditure 
may take place in another accounting period. 
(2) "Appropriation" means an allocation of money for a specific purpose. 
(3) (a) "Budget" means a plan for financial operations for a fiscal period, 
embodying estimates for proposed expenditures for given purposes and the 
means of financing the expenditures. 
(b) "Budget" may refer to the budget of a fund for which a budget is required by 
law, or collectively to the budgets for all those funds. 
(4) "Budgetary fund" means a fund for which a budget is required, such as those 
described in Section 17-36-8. 
(5) "Budget officer" means the county auditor, county clerk, or county executive 
as provided in Subsection 17-19-19(1). 
(6) "Budget period" means the fiscal period for which a budget is prepared. 
(7) "Check" means an order in a specific amount drawn upon the depositary by 
any authorized officer in accordance with Section 17-19-3 or 17-24-1. 
(8) "Countywide service" means a service provided in both incorporated and 
unincorporated areas of a county. 
(9) "Current period" means the fiscal period in which a budget is prepared and 
adopted. 
(10) "Department" means any functional unit within a fund which carries on a 
specific activity. 
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(11) "Encumbrance system" means a method of budgetary control where part of 
an appropriation is reserved to cover a specific expenditure by charging 
obligations, such as purchase orders, contracts, or salary commitments to an 
appropriation account. An expenditure ceases to be an encumbrance when paid 
or when the actual liability is entered in the books of account. 
(12) "Estimated revenue" means any revenue estimated to be received during the 
budget period in any fund for which a budget is prepared. 
(13) "Fiscal period" means the annual or biennial period for recording county 
fiscal operations. 
(14) "Fund" means an independent fiscal and accounting entity comprised of a 
sum of money or other resources segregated for a specific purpose or objective. 
(15) "Fund balance" means the excess of the assets over liabilities, reserves, and 
contributions, as reflected by its books of account. 
(16) "Fund deficit" means the excess of liabilities, reserves, and contributions 
over its assets, as reflected by its books of account. 
(17) "General Fund" means the fund used to account for all receipts, 
disbursements, assets, liabilities, reserves, fund balances, revenues, and 
expenditures not required to be accounted for in other funds. 
(18) "Interfund loan" means a loan of cash from one fund to another, subject to 
future repayment; but it does not constitute an expenditure or a use of retained 
earnings, fund balance, or unappropriated surplus of the lending fund. 
(19) "Last completed fiscal period" means the fiscal period next preceding the 
current period. 
(20) "Modified accrual basis of accounting" means a method under which 
expenditures other than accrued interest on general long-term debt are recorded 
at the time liabilities are incurred and revenues are recorded when they become 
measurable and available to finance expenditures of the current period. 
(21) "Municipal capital project" means the acquisition, construction, or 
improvement of capital assets that facilitate providing municipal service. 
(22) "Municipal service" means a service not provided on a county wide basis 
and not accounted for in an enterprise fund, and includes police patrol, fire 
protection, culinary or irrigation water retail service, water conservation, local 
parks, sewers, sewage treatment and disposal, cemeteries, garbage and refuse 
collection, street lighting, airports, planning and zoning, local streets and roads, 
curb, gutter, and sidewalk maintenance, and ambulance service. 
(23) "Retained earnings" means that part of the net earnings retained by an 
enterprise or internal service fund which is not segregated or reserved for any 
specific purpose. 
(24) "Special fund" means any fund other than the General Fund, such as those 
described in Section 17-36-6. 
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(25) "Unappropriated surplus" means that part of a fund which is not 
appropriated for an ensuing budget period. 
(26) "Warrant" means an order in a specific amount drawn upon the treasurer by 
the auditor. 
History: L. 1975, ch. 22, § 3; 1983, ch. 71, § 1; 1983, ch. 73, § 2; 1985, ch. 
210, § 1; 1986, ch. 105, § 1; 1996, ch. 212, § 10; 1999, ch. 300, § 18; 2001, 
ch. 241, § 52. 
54-2-1. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
* * * * 
(15) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, 
electrical corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical 
cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, 
sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not 
described in Subsection (15)(d), where the service is performed for, or the 
commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation 
or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any 
member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial 
use. 
* * * * 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 2, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 4782; L. 1925, ch. 12, § 1; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-2-1; L. 1948 (1st S.S.), ch. 7, § 1; 1957, ch. 106, § 
1; 1959, ch. 94, § 1; 1965, ch. 106, § 1; 1969, ch. 153, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 1; 
1985, ch. 97, § 1; 1985, ch. 98, § 1; 1985, ch. 180, § 1; 1985, ch. 188, § 1; 
1985, ch. 253, § 1; 1986, ch. 13; 1986, ch. 194, § 8; 1986, ch. 215, § 1; 1989, 
ch. 20, § 1; 1992, ch. 227, § 1; 1995, ch. 173, § 3; 1995, ch. 316, § 6; 1996, 
ch. 170, § 47; 2000, ch. 55, § 1; 2001, ch. 212, § 1. 
72-3-103. County roads - Class B roads - Construction and maintenance by 
counties. 
(1) County roads comprise all public highways, roads, and streets within the 
state that: 
(a) are situated outside of incorporated municipalities and not designated as state 
highways; 
(b) have been designated as county roads; or 
(c) are located on property under the control of a federal agency and constructed 
or maintained by the county under agreement with the appropriate federal 
agency. 
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(2) County roads are class B roads. 
(3) The state and county have joint undivided interest in the title to all rights-of-
way for all county roads. 
(4) The county governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of county 
roads within the county. 
(5) The county shall construct and maintain each county road using funds made 
available for that purpose. 
(6) The county legislative body may expend funds allocated to each county from 
the Transportation Fund under rules made by the department. 
(7) A county legislative body may use any portion of the class B road funds 
provided by this chapter for the construction and maintenance of class A state 
roads by cooperative agreement with the department. 
(8) A county may enter into agreements with the appropriate federal agency for 
the use of federal funds, county road funds, and donations to county road funds 
to construct, improve, or maintain county roads within or partly within national 
forests. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 22; 1967, ch. 50, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 13; 1993, 
ch. 227, § 296; 1994, ch. 120, § 31; C. 1953, 27-12-22; renumbered by L. 
1998, ch. 270, § 72; 2000, ch. 324, § 2. 
72-3-104. City streets - Class C roads - Construction and maintenance. 
(1) City streets comprise: 
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate limits of the municipalities 
that are not designated as class A state roads or as class B roads; and 
(b) those highways, roads, and streets located within a national forest and 
constructed or maintained by the municipality under agreement with the 
appropriate federal agency. 
(2) City streets are class C roads. 
(3) Except for city streets within counties of the first and second class as defined 
in Section 17-16-13, the state and city have joint undivided interest in the title to 
all rights-of-way for all city streets. 
(4) The municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the 
city streets within the municipality. 
(5) The department shall cooperate with the municipal legislative body in the 
construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each municipality. 
(6) The municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be expended upon the 
class C roads the funds allocated to each municipality from the Transportation 
Fund under rules made by the department. 
(7) Any town or city in the third class may: 
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(a) contract with the county or the department for the construction and 
maintenance of class C roads within its corporate limits; or 
(b) transfer, with the consent of the county, its: 
(i) class C roads to the class B road system; and 
(ii) funds allocated from the Transportation Fund to the municipality to the 
county legislative body for use upon die transferred class C roads. 
(8) A municipal legislative body of any municipality of the third class may use 
any portion of the class C road funds allocated to the municipality for the 
construction of sidewalks, curbs, and gutters on class A state roads within the 
municipal limits by cooperative agreement with the department. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 23; 1969, ch. 67, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 14; 1993, 
ch. 227, § 297; 1994, ch. 120, § 32; C. 1953, 27-12-23; renumbered by L. 
1998, ch. 270, § 73; 2000, ch. 324, § 3. 
72-5-401. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Corridor" means the path or proposed path of a transportation facility that 
exists or that may exist in the future. A corridor may include the land occupied 
or to be occupied by a transportation facility, and any other land that may be 
needed for expanding a transportation facility or for controlling access to it. 
(2) "Corridor preservation" means planning or acquisition processes intended to: 
(a) protect or enhance the capacity of existing corridors; and 
(b) protect the availability of proposed corridors in advance of the need for and 
the actual commencement of the transportation facility construction. 
(3) "Development" means: 
(a) the subdividing of land; 
(b) the construction of improvements, expansions, or additions; or 
(c) any other action that will appreciably increase the value of and the future 
acquisition cost of land. 
(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government authorities and recorded 
in county recording offices that: 
(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way, centerline alignments, and setbacks 
for highways and other transportation facilities; 
(b) provides a basis for restricting development in designated rights-of-way or 
between designated setbacks to allow the government authorities time to 
purchase or otherwise reserve the land; and 
(c) for counties and municipalities may be adopted as an element of the general 
plan, pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3, General Plan, or Title 10, 
Chapter 9, Part 3, General Plan. 
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(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise of eminent domain or 
other police power, whereby government puts private property to public use or 
restrains use of private property for public purposes, and that requires 
compensation to be paid to private property owners. 
History: C. 1953, 72-5-401, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 9. 
72-5-402. Public purpose. 
The Legislature finds and declares that the planning and preservation of 
transportation corridors is a public purpose, that the acquisition of public rights 
in private property for possible use as a transportation corridor up to 20 years in 
advance is a public purpose, and that acquisition of public rights in private 
property for possible use as alternative transportation corridors is a public 
purpose, even if one or more of the transportation corridors is eventually not 
used for a public purpose, so long as reasonable evidence exists at the time of 
acquisition that the corridor will be developed within 20 years. 
History: C. 1953, 72-5-402, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 10. 
72-5-403. Transportation corridor preservation powers. 
(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may: 
(a) act in cooperation with one another and other government entities to promote 
planning for and enhance the preservation of transportation corridors and to 
more effectively use the monies available in the Transportation Corridor 
Preservation Revolving Loan Fund created in Section 72-2-117; 
(b) undertake transportation corridor planning, review, and preservation 
processes; and 
(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights of less than fee simple, including 
easement and development rights, or the rights to limit development, including 
rights in alternative transportation corridors, and to make these acquisitions up to 
20 years in advance of using those rights in actual transportation facility 
construction. 
(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection (1), counties and 
municipalities may: 
(a) limit development for transportation corridor preservation by land use 
regulation and by official maps; and 
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for approving limited development in 
transportation corridors until the time transportation facility construction begins. 
History: C. 1953, 72-5-403, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 11. 
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72-5-405. Private owner rights. 
(1) The department, counties, and municipalities shall observe all protections 
conferred on private property rights, including Title 63, Chapter 90, Private 
Property Protection Act, Title 63, Chapter 90a, Constitutional Taking Issues, 
and compensation for takings. 
(2) Private property owners from whom less than fee simple rights are obtained 
for transportation corridors or transportation corridor preservation have the right 
to petition the department, a county, or a municipality to acquire the entire fee 
simple interest in the affected property. 
(3) (a) A private property owner whose property's development is limited or 
restricted by a power granted under this part may petition the county or 
municipality that adopted the official map to acquire less than or the entire fee 
simple interest in the affected property, at the option of the property owner. 
(b) If the county or municipality petitioned under Subsection (3)(a) does not 
acquire the interest in the property requested by the property owner, then the 
county or municipality may not exercise any of the powers granted under this 
part to limit or restrict the affected property's development. 
History: C. 1953, 72-5-405, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 13. 
72-10-413. Purchase or condemnation of air rights or navigation easements. 
A political subdivision within which the property or nonconforming use is 
located or the political subdivision owning the airport or served by it may 
acquire, by purchase, grant, or condemnation in the manner provided by the law 
under which political subdivisions are authorized to acquire real property for 
public purposes, an air right, navigation easement, or other estate or interest in 
the property or nonconforming structure or use in question if: 
(1) it is desired to remove, lower, or otherwise terminate a nonconforming 
structure or use; 
(2) the approach protection necessary cannot, because of constitutional 
limitations, be provided by airport zoning regulations under this part; or 
(3) it appears advisable that the necessary approach protection be provided by 
acquisition of property rights rather than by airport zoning regulations. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 10, § 13; C. 1943, Supp., 4-0-80; C. 1953, 2-4-13; 
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 320. 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised in behalf of the following public uses: 
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the United States. 
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(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses 
authorized by the Legislature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or incorporated 
town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or 
pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county or city or 
incorporated town, or for the draining of any county, city or incorporated town; 
the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and 
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; 
and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, 
or the inhabitants thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, 
plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or road 
locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street 
railways for public transportation. 
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and 
pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the 
reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation 
purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs 
and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other 
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution. 
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping 
places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in 
solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, 
refuse or water from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or 
from mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in 
solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any 
subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of 
natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may 
be required adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such 
underground natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other 
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in common 
by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral 
deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place 
for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for 
electric light and power plants. 
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten 
families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or 
university. 
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(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of 
generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat. 
(11) Cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with 
the manufacture of beet sugar. 
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and 
necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to take lands for 
the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and dust therefrom, 
produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the powers granted by 
this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county where the population 
exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the limits of any city or 
incorporated town; nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate 
by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at least seventy-five per cent in 
value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius 
of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor 
beyond the limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, 
easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of land 
within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter or other 
works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced 
to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of 
ores. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-34-1; L. 1957, ch. 174, § 
1; 1963, ch. 193, § 1; 1969, ch. 258, § 1; 1973, ch. 206, § 1; 1981, ch. 164, § 
1. 
78-34-17. Rights of cities and towns not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute 
providing for the taking of property in any city or town for street purposes. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-34-17. 
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